Bibliography
References
This bibliography maps the arguments and images that shape Worldline Identity Theory. It is not exhaustive; it is a route into the literature. The theory sits at the intersection of two traditions: the physics of spacetime, especially special relativity and the block universe, and the metaphysics of persistence and personal identity, especially four-dimensionalism.
Key figures on the physics side include Minkowski, who unified space and time into a single geometrical structure; Rietdijk and Putnam, who pressed the relativity of simultaneity against presentism; and Smart and Mellor, who developed the tenseless, block-universe view of time. On the metaphysics side, the theory draws on the four-dimensionalism of Sider, Parfit's work on personal identity and branching, and the broader debates over endurance and perdurance. The recurrence half of the theory takes its classical prompt from Nietzsche and its modern shape from discussions of large or cyclic state spaces.
01Physics & time
1905
Einstein, A. (1905). "On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies." Annalen der Physik 17.
Special relativity and the relativity of simultaneity.
1908
Minkowski, H. (1908). "Space and Time." Address to the 80th Assembly of German Natural Scientists and Physicians.
The geometrical unification of space and time into spacetime.
1966
Rietdijk, C. W. (1966). "A Rigorous Proof of Determinism Derived from the Special Theory of Relativity." Philosophica 16.
An early argument connecting relativity to determinism and the block universe.
1967
Putnam, H. (1967). "Time and Physical Geometry." The Journal of Philosophy 64, no. 8.
The Rietdijk–Putnam argument against presentism from the relativity of simultaneity.
1963
Smart, J. J. C. (1963). "Philosophy and Scientific Realism." Routledge & Kegan Paul.
A classic defence of the tenseless, block-universe view of time.
1998
Mellor, D. H. (1998). "Real Time II." Routledge.
A systematic tenseless account of time and causation.
2006
Butterfield, J. (2006). "The Rotating Discs Argument Defeated." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57.
On the compatibility of eternalism and dynamic physical processes.
02Metaphysics & identity
2001
Sider, T. (2001). Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford University Press.
The standard contemporary defence of four-dimensionalism in metaphysics.
1908
McTaggart, J. M. E. (1908). The Unreality of Time. Mind 17.
The A-series / B-series distinction that frames the eternalism debate.
1984
Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
Teletransportation, branching, and what makes someone the same person over time.
1986
Lewis, D. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford University Press.
Counterpart theory and the metaphysics of possible individuals.
1981
Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
Closest-continuer theory of personal identity.
1970
Williams, B. (1970). The Self and the Future. Philosophical Review 79.
Thought experiments about bodily and psychological continuity.
03Recurrence
1882
Nietzsche, F. (1882). The Gay Science. § 341.
The classical formulation of eternal recurrence.
2003
Bostrom, N. (2003). Are You Living in a Computer Simulation?. Philosophical Quarterly 53.
Modern arguments about recurrence and simulation in finite state spaces.
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